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1 Introduction
Ronald Coase (1972) considered a monopolist in possession of a quantity of
some durable good to which she attaches no value. Demand is such that all
of the good could be sold at a positive price. Coase argues that (i) all of the
good will therefore be sold eventually; (ii) since every potential buyer knows
this, none will be prepared to pay more than any other buyer; and hence (iii)
every unit will sell more-or-less instantly for a price equal to the valuation
of the marginal buyer. This is the famous Coase conjecture. It reveals how
the monopolist “competes with herself” — that is, later instantiations of the
monopolist compete with earlier ones — so as to drive market profits down
to their competitive level.
Coase’s argument is easily adapted to the case of a seller with a sin-
gle, indivisible unit of some durable good, facing a single potential buyer
whose valuation is unknown to the seller (though it is commonly known to
exceed the seller’s). To do so, we reinterpret the demand curve faced by
Coase’s monopolist as the (inverse) decumulative distribution function de-
scribing the buyer’s valuation. If the seller makes take-it-or-leave-it offers,
Coase’s conjecture implies that she will quickly come to accept that the best
she can do is offer a price equal to the lowest valuation in the support of the
valuation distribution, which the buyer will duly accept.
Of course, Coase’s argument is informal, and step (ii) in particular is
rather casual about the time costs of waiting for a lower price and the pos-
sibility that different buyers will have different incentives to wait. However,
several subsequent papers have placed the argument on a sounder footing.1
These papers show that, under certain conditions,2 the following version of
the Coase conjecture may be proved: as the time between seller offers van-
ishes, the seller’s initial offer converges to the minimum value in the support
of the valuation distribution.3
More recently still, McAfee and Vincent (1997) showed that the Coase
conjecture may be extended to the case of n buyers whose unknown valua-
tions are independent draws from some common distribution. They consider
a scenario in which the seller holds a sequence of sealed-bid auctions with
1See the survey by Ausubel, Crampton and Deneckere (2002).
2One being that there exist an ε > 0 such that it is common knowledge that the buyer’s
valuation exceeds the seller’s by at least ε — the so-called “gap” assumption.
3See Tirole (1988) for a nice introduction to the Coase conjecture and a sketch proof
for the “no gap” case.
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posted reserve prices, and show that a Coasian dynamic characterises the
reserve price path.4 They also demonstrate that first-price and second-price
auctions are revenue-equivalent in this repeated auction game.
The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, we show that the
repeated English auction leads to a lower equilibrium path of reserve prices
than the sealed-bid format.5 Second, we show that, nevertheless, the English
and sealed-bid formats are revenue equivalent.6 It follows then from the
analysis in McAfee and Vicnent (1997) that the usual Coasian logic applies
to repeated English auctions.
The proof of the first result closely follows that in McAfee and Vincent
(1997), which in turn is based on the classic argument in Fudenberg, Levine
and Tirole (1985). However, the process of adaptation is useful for exposing
the intuition behind the result. Sealed-bid auctions induce earlier bidding
— ceteris paribus — because they attract fewer participants. With English
auctions, once bidding starts, all bidders participate, dropping out only once
their value is reached. With sealed-bid auctions, bidders cannot observe
whether any other bidder has submitted a bid in the current round. By
bidding early, a bidder in a sealed-bid auction can eliminate competition
from rivals with lower valuations (that are nevertheless above the current
reserve) who plan to wait and bid in subsequent rounds.
It is therefore not obvious that the two auction formats will yield the same
revenue to the seller. On the one hand, bidders in sealed-bid auctions, facing
the same path of reserve prices, will bid earlier than in English auctions,
which is good for the seller. But on the other hand, the participation effect
will reduce the expected price, which is bad. We show that, in equilibrium,
the seller arranges matters so that these two effects exactly cancel each other.
Moreover, the good will be allocated in exactly the same way. That is to say,
if the maximum bidder value is v, the good will sell in the same period
for the same expected price under either format. This provides a Revenue
4They too make the “gap” assumption.
5See Grant, Kajii, Menezes and Ryan (2006) for an analysis of repeated English auctions
when bidders arrive randomly (eg, according to a Poisson process), and participate in only
one auction round.
6Beckert (2006) compares sequential sealed-bid auctions with sequential take-it-or-
leave-it pricing, for a two-period model. As shown in the 2002 Working Paper version,
sequential sealed-bid auctions are revenue dominated by sequential take-it-or-leave-it pric-
ing when players are sufficiently patient. We are unaware of any work that compares the
revenue from the two mechanisms in an infinite period setting.
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Equivalence result.
2 The repeated English auction
For ease of comparison, we adhere closely to the set-up inMcAfee and Vincent
(1997; henceforth MV97). A monopoly seller has a single indivisible good to
which she attaches consumption value zero. There are n potential buyers.
Each buyer’s valuation is an independent realisation of a random variable
with cumulative distribution function F . This distribution satisfies F (1) =
0, F (vH) = 1 and has strictly positive and bounded density f on [1, vH ].
Moreover, we assume f is continuous at 1. Buyers and seller are risk neutral
with identical rate of time preference ρ.
The seller holds a potentially infinite sequence of English auctions until
a sale is achieved. Within each round she posts a reserve price. The rules of
the auction oblige her to sell to the highest bidder if a serious bid (i.e., one
weakly above the reserve) is received. Moreover, she has access to a limited
commitment technology. She can commit not to sell in the current round if
bidding fails to reach the reserve, but she cannot commit to cancel future
auctions if the object remains unsold. The payoff to a bidder who fails to
secure the object is assumed to be zero, no matter when the sale occurs.
There is no delay between auction rounds and the nominal duration of
each auction is fixed at one unit of time. However, we assume that auctions
have a “soft ending”, so bidders always have an opportunity to respond to a
new bid: there is no “last moment” in which a bid could be submitted so as
to exclude counter-bids. Lemma 0(i) shows that optimal bidding strategies
may be assumed to be independent of the elapsed time during auctions, so
no-one expects this “soft ending” facility to be called upon.7 Thus, if the
object is expected to sell after t rounds for a price p to a bidder with valuation
v, the buyer anticipates payoff δt (v − p) and the seller anticipates δtp, where
δ = e−ρ.
We denote this repeated auction game G and shall use the notion of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (pBe) to “solve” G.
It is clear that once a serious bid has been submitted, everyone knows that
they are in a one-shot auction, so each bidder will bid up to his valuation
7It may, of course, be called upon out of equilibrium. However, if off-equilibrium sniping
of this sort were to take place, the game would end in the round in which it occurs. In such
contingencies, all bidders bid their values, so these contingencies are covered by Lemma 0.
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during the current round. It remains only to specify the contingencies in
which a bidder initiates serious bidding (with positive probability), and the
(positive) probability with which he submits a serious bid in each of those
contingencies. We shall refer to this as the bidder’s bid initiation strategy.
Lemma 0. In any pBe:
(i) A bidder will bid up to his valuation in the current round if a seri-
ous bid has previously been submitted during that round. The set
of pBe outcomes (i.e., distributions over reserve price path, time of
sale, winning bidder and selling price) is unaffected if we assume
that bid initiation strategies depend on (at most) the current and
previous reserve prices.
(ii) [Successive skimming] If a bidder with valuation v finds it optimal
to initiate serious bidding in round t, with current reserve price
Rt and following history ht−1 = (R1, R2, ..., Rt−1), then a bidder
with valuation v0 > v will find it strictly optimal to do so.
Given Lemma 0, we shall henceforth summarise the seller’s posterior beliefs
about the distribution over bidder values by the point v at which those beliefs
truncate F . A proof of Lemma 0 may be found in the Appendix.
It remains to characterise the bid-initiation strategies and the equilibrium
path of reserve prices. The argument, which closely follows that in MV97, is
based on the following sequence of artificially truncated games:
G (j, v): the repeated auction game in which the seller begins with posterior
v and is required to hold a $1 reserve auction if the object remains
unsold after j rounds. (The seller’s payoff function in G (j, v) will be
assumed not to condition on bidder values being bounded by v.)
Analysis of these truncated games proves useful as the seller’s optimal con-
tinuation strategy, given any posterior, will always set a $1 reserve in finite
time — see Lemma 2.
As in MV97, let us initialise
γ0 (v) ≡ γ−1 (v) ≡ {1}
r0 (x) ≡ 1
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and let Y1 be the random variable equal to the highest valuation amongst
n − 1 bidders, with FY1 ≡ Fn−1 the distribution of Y1 and fY1 ≡ F 0Y1 the
associated density.
Note that
Π0 (v) =
Z v
1
Z X1
1
nY1f (X1) dFY1dX1 (1)
is the seller’s (equilibrium) payoff in G (0, v).
Now consider G (1, v). Define r1 (x) to be a reserve price that makes
a bidder of valuation x indifferent between initiating bidding in the first
round of G (1, v) or waiting for the $1 reserve auction next period. Since x
is the marginal bid initiator in the current round, and since the marginal
bidder earns a non-zero payoff only if x is the highest value amongst the
bidders, the marginal bidder’s decision is made on the assumption that the
game will proceed to the next round with certainty if he decides to wait.
However, unlike in MV97, if the marginal bidder were to initiate bidding in
the current round, it is possible that he wins the auction but pays above
the reserve price — lower value bidders immediately join the bidding once a
serious bid is received. Thus:
[x− r1 (x)]FY1 (r1 (x)) +
Z x
r1(x)
(x− Y1) dFY1 = δ
Z x
1
(x− Y1) dFY1
Equivalently:
r1 (x)FY1 (r1 (x)) +
Z x
r1(x)
Y1dFY1 = (1− δ)xFY1 (x) + δ
Z x
1
Y1dFY1 (2)
Lemma A1. The solution r1 (x) to (2) is unique, continuous and strictly
increasing in x. Moreover, r1 (x) < x for x > 1.
Proof. SinceZ x
1
Y1dFY1 ≤ (1− δ)xFY1 (x) + δ
Z x
1
Y1dFY1 ≤ xFY1 (x)
and the function
zFY1 (z) +
Z x
z
Y1dFY1 (3)
is continuous in z ∈ [1, x], there is at least one solution to (2). By direct
calculation, the function (3) is strictly increasing in z ∈ [1, x], so there is at
most one solution. Continuity of r1 (x) is obvious.
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To see that r1 (x) is strictly increasing, note that
∂
∂x
∙Z x
z
Y1dFY1 − (1− δ)xFY1 (x) − δ
Z x
1
Y1dFY1
¸
= − (1− δ)FY1 (x)
< 0.
Since (3) is strictly increasing in z ∈ [1, x], it follows that r1 (x) must increase
to restore equality (2) when x increases.
That r1 (x) < x for x > 1 is now obvious. ¤
By virtue of Lemma A1, we can think of the seller in G (1, v) choosing the
cutoff value x rather than the reserve price.
If we let
pj (x) = rj (x)FY1 (rj (x)) +
Z x
rj(x)
Y1dFY1 j = 0, 1 (4)
we may express (2) as follows:
p1 (x) = (1− δ)xFY1 (x) + δp0 (x) (5)
Note that pj (x) is the (unconditional) expected price that a bidder with
value x anticipates paying if they win an auction with reserve price rj (x).
Since (3) is a strictly increasing function of z ∈ [1, x], there is a one-to-one
mapping from rj (x) to pj (x). This allows us to re-write (1) as follows:
Π0 (v) =
Z v
1
nf (X1) p0 (X1) dX1.
Next, we define
g1 (v, x) =
r1 (x)nFY1 (r1 (x)) [F (v)− F (x)] +
Z v
x
Z X1
r1(x)
nY1f (X1) dFY1dX1 + δΠ0 (x)
This is the payoff to the seller in G (1, v) when she chooses x to be the
marginal bid initiator in the current round. Using (4), it may be expressed
as follows:
g1 (v, x) = n
Z v
x
∙
p1 (x) +
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1
¸
f (X1) dX1 + δΠ0 (x) (6)
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Lemma 1. There exists an ε > 0 such that r1 (v) = 1 for all δ ∈ (0, 1), all
n and all v < 1 + ε.
Proof. We shall show that there is some ε > 0 such that
∂g1 (v, x)
∂x
< 0
whenever 1 < x ≤ v < 1 + ε. Note that, using (6),
∂g1 (v, x)
∂x
= −np1 (x) f (x) + n
Z v
x
½
∂p1 (x)
∂x
− xfY1 (x)
¾
f (X1) dX1 + δΠ00 (x)
= −nf (x) (1− δ)xFY1 (x) + n [F (v)− F (x)]
½
∂p1 (x)
∂x
− xfY1 (x)
¾
= −nxf (x) (1− δ)FY1 (x) + n [F (v)− F (x)] (1− δ)FY1 (x)
where the second equality uses (5) and
Π00 (x) = nf (x)
Z x
1
Y1dFY1
and the last uses (5). Thus:
∂g1 (v, x)
∂x
= (1− δ)nFY1 (x) [F (v)− F (x)− xf (x)]
This matches the expression on p.266 of MV97, despite the differences be-
tween our expression for g1 (v, x) and their analogous expression for g1 (v, x, 1)
(see p.256). The Lemma therefore follows by the MV97 argument. ¤
We now prove that the original game ends in finitely many rounds along
any pBe path.
Lemma 2. There exists some T <∞ such that the seller’s pBe continuation
strategy for G, given any belief v, will set a $1 reserve in no more than
T further rounds.
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Proof. If v = vH then it is obvious that v must fall below vH next period
when the seller follows an optimal strategy. Let v < vH be (an upper bound
on) this subsequent posterior. Suppose, therefore, that the seller’s current
posterior is v ≤ v, and that by following an optimal strategy this posterior
will fall by z if the good remains unsold after k subsequent periods. Let Π (v)
denote the seller’s expected discounted revenue along the pBe continuation
path. Then
Π (v) ≤ n [F (v)− F (v − z)] vH + δkvH
since n [F (v)− F (v − z)] is an upper bound on the probability that the
maximum bidder value lies in [v − z, v] and vH is an upper bound on the
selling price. Since f is bounded, there exists f < ∞ such that f ≤ f on
[1, v]. Thus:
Π (v) ≤
£
nzf + δk
¤
vH
Note that this upper bound is independent of v. Furthermore, the bound goes
to zero if z → 0 and k →∞. The seller can guarantee a sale immediately by
posting a $1 reserve. From Lemma 1 we deduce the existence of some ε > 0
such that
Π (v) ≥ F (v) ≥ F (1 + ε) > 0.
It follows that there is some z > 0 and some k < ∞ such that the seller’s
posterior falls by at least z after k periods, independently of the value of
v ≤ v. The result now follows directly. ¤
As in MV97 we define:
Π1 (v) = max
x≤v
g1 (v, x)
γ1 (v) = argmaxx≤v g1 (v, x)
Lemma B1. The function Π1 (v) is continuous and non-decreasing.
Proof. Continuity follows by the Theorem of the Maximum, given continuity
of p1 (x) (Lemma A1). That Π1 (v) is non-decreasing is obvious. ¤
Lemma C1. The correspondence γ1 is non-decreasing8 and uhc. Moreover9
γ∗1 (v) = max γ1 (v) < v
8That is, if v0 > v, x ∈ γ1 (v) and x0 ∈ γ1 (v0), then x0 ≥ x.
9Note that the following maximum is well-defined, since uhc correspondences are
compact-valued: Berge (1997, p.110).
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for any v > 1.
Proof. That γ1 is uhc follows by the Theorem of the Maximum, given
continuity of r1 (x) (Lemma A1).
To see that it is non-decreasing, suppose v0 > v, x ∈ γ1 (v), x0 ∈ γ1 (v0)
and x0 < x. Then
g1 (v0, x0) ≥ g1 (v0, x)
and
g1 (v, x) ≥ g1 (v, x0)
from which we deduce
g1 (v0, x0)− g1 (v, x0) ≥ g1 (v0, x)− g (v, x)
which is equivalent to
n
Z v0
v
∙
p1 (x0) +
Z X1
x0
Y1dFY1
¸
f (X1) dX1
≥ n
Z v0
v
∙
p1 (x) +
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1
¸
f (X1) dX1 (7)
But
p1 (z) +
Z X1
z
Y1dFY1 = r1 (z)FY1 (r1 (z)) +
Z X1
r1(z)
Y1dFY1
is strictly increasing in z, since r1 (z) is strictly increasing in z (Lemma A1),
as is (3). It follows that (7) is impossible.
Finally, from the proof of Theorem 1, we see that
∂g1 (v, x)
∂x
¯¯¯¯
x=v
< 0
when v > 1, so γ∗1 (v) = v is excluded. ¤
While γ1 (v) may not be a singleton, it is obvious that the seller in G (2, v)
prefers that first-round bidders anticipate the highest credible reserve price
in the second round to encourage them to bid earlier. Hence, if play in
G (2, v) reaches the second round, we expect the equilibrium cutoff to be
chosen according to γ∗1 (v).
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Next, consider G (2, v). Given w ≤ x ≤ v, let rj (x,w) be a reserve price
that makes a bidder of valuation x indifferent between initiating bidding in
the first round of G (2, v) or the second.10 The variable w is the second-
round marginal bid initiator anticipated by the first-round marginal bidder.
Arguing as for G (1, v) we have:
r2 (x,w)FY1 (r2 (x,w)) +
Z x
r2(x,w)
Y1dFY1 =
(1− δ)xFY1 (x) + δ
½
r1 (w)FY1 (r1 (w)) +
Z x
r1(w)
Y1dFY1
¾
(8)
This is the analogue of the expression on p.255 of MV97 with j = 2. Unlike
their expression, with an English auction format the variable w only affects
the marginal bidder’s decision through its impact on the reserve price path:
if r1 did not depend on w then neither would r2 nor the identity of the
first-round marginal bidder. If we let
p2 (x,w) = r2 (x,w)FY1 (r2 (x,w)) +
Z x
r2(x,w)
Y1dFY1
we may express (8) as follows:
p2 (x,w) = (1− δ) xFY1 (x) + δp1 (w) (9)
Lemma A2. The solution r2 (x,w) to (8) is unique. It is also continuous
and strictly increasing in each argument. Finally, r2 (x,w) < x for
x > w ≥ 1.
Proof. All parts of Lemma A2 apart from r2 (x,w) being continuous and
strictly increasing in w may be proved along the lines of Lemma A1. We
omit the details. The remaining parts of the Lemma follow easily from (8),
10Lemma 0 shows that, in each round, the seller’s optimal strategy will carve a “top
slice” from [1, v] — possibly the whole interval (i.e., by setting a $1 reserve). It is also
intuitive that the seller will never choose this slice to be empty, as delay is costly. Hence,
in each period, the seller’s equilibrium strategy either sets a $1 reserve, or there is a
marginal type x < v who is indifferent between initiating bidding now or waiting. Since x
will be the seller’s posterior next period, this bidder will certainly bid in the next round.
Hence, it suffices to consider the bidder who is indifferent between initiating bidding now
or next period, since the marginal bidder today will never wait more than one round before
bidding.
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using the facts that r1 (w) is strictly increasing in w (Lemma A1) and (3) is
strictly increasing in z. ¤
Next, we define:
g2 (v, x, w) = n
Z v
x
∙
p2 (x,w) +
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1
¸
f (X1) dX1 + δΠ1 (x) (10)
and hence, using the fact that g2 is continuous in (x,w),
Π2 (v) = max
x≤v, w∈γ1(x)
g2 (v, x, w)
γ2 (v) = argmaxx≤v
∙
max
w∈γ1(x)
g2 (v, x, w)
¸
Lemma B2. The function Π2 (v) is continuous and non-decreasing.
Proof. Continuity follows by the Theorem of the Maximum, given the prop-
erties of p1 (x,w) established in Lemma A2 and continuity of Π1 (v) (Lemma
B1). That Π2 (v) is non-decreasing is obvious. ¤
Lemma C2. The correspondence γ2 is non-decreasing and uhc. Moreover
γ∗2 (v) = max γ2 (v) < v
for any v > 1.
Proof. To see that γ∗ (v) < v when v > 1, note that Π2 (v) ≥ Π1 (v). Since
g2 (v, v, w) = δΠ1 (v)
the result follows.
To prove the rest of Lemma C2, define
h (v, x) = max
w∈γ1(x)
g2 (v, x, w) .
Using Lemmas B1 and C1 and the Theorem of the Maximum, we deduce
that h is usc. Hence γ2 is uhc by another application of the Theorem of the
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Maximum. That γ2 is non-decreasing follows by the argument in the proof
of Lemma C1, with h in place of g1. ¤
Once again, if play in G (3, v) reaches the second round, we expect the equi-
librium cutoff to be chosen according to γ∗2 (v) to put maximal pressure on
bidders in the first round.
Finally, consider G (j, v) for j > 2. Given w ≤ x ≤ v, we define rj (x,w)
to be a reserve price that makes a bidder of valuation x indifferent between
initiating bidding in the first round of G (j, v) or the second. Then:
rj (x,w)FY1 (rj (x,w)) +
Z x
rj(x,w)
Y1dFY1 =
(1− δ)xFY1 (x)+ δ
(
rj−1
¡
w, γ∗j−2
¢
FY1
¡
rj−1
¡
w, γ∗j−2
¢¢
+
Z x
rj−1(w,γ∗j−2)
Y1dFY1
)
(11)
where γ∗j−2 is the equilibrium value of the marginal bid-initiator two periods
hence. As usual, by defining
pj (x,w) = rj (x,w)FY1 (rj (x,w)) +
Z x
rj(x,w)
Y1dFY1
we may express (11) as follows:
pj (x,w) = (1− δ)xFY1 (x) + δpj−1
¡
w, γ∗j−2
¢
Letting
gj (v, x, w) = n
Z v
x
∙
pj (x,w) +
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1
¸
f (X1) dX1 + δΠj−1 (x)
Πj (v) = max
x≤v, w∈γj−1(x)
gj (v, x, w)
γj (v) = argmaxx≤v
∙
max
w∈γj−1(x)
gj (v, x, w)
¸
analogous arguments to those used in proving Lemmas A2—C2, plus the prin-
ciple of induction, give, for each j ≥ 3:
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Lemma Aj. The solution rj (x,w) to (11) is unique. It is also continuous
and strictly increasing in each argument. Finally, rj (x,w) < x for
x > w ≥ 1.
Lemma Bj. The function Πj (v) is continuous and non-decreasing.
Lemma Cj. The correspondence γj is non-decreasing and uhc. Moreover
γ∗j (v) = max γj (v) < v
for any v > 1.
Let us now construct the sequence {zi}∞i=0 as follows: z0 = 1,
z1 = sup {v | γ∗1 (v) = 1}
and
zi = min {sup {v | γ∗i (v) < zi−1} , vH}
for i > 1. Combining Lemmas 1, 2 and Cj, there is some T <∞ such that
1 = z0 < z1 < · · · < zT = vH .
If we define Γi = [zi−1, zi) for i = 1, 2, ..., T − 1 and ΓT = [zT−1, zT ], then
γ∗j (v) < zj−1 when v ∈ Γj and j ≥ 2.
Lemma 3. For each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, if v ∈ Γi then γj (v) = γi (v) for all j,
and hence Πj (v) = Πi (v) for all j also.
Proof. Since γ∗j (v) ≤ v (Lemma Cj) a simple inductive argument implies
that γ∗j (v) = 1 for all v ∈ Γ1 and all j. This proves the result for i = 1.
Consider v ∈ Γ2. The seller in G (2, v) will choose a $1 reserve after one
further round, so her optimal strategy will be the same in G (1, v), implying
γ1 (v) = γ2 (v). Conversely, for j > 2, the seller in G (j, v) will set a $1
reserve after no more than j−1 rounds, since γ∗j (x) ≤ x (Lemma Cj). Thus,
an inductive argument gives γj (v) = γ2 (v).
Hence, by another layer of induction, we deduce the result. ¤
We may therefore define γ, γ∗ and Π on
£
1, vH
¤
in the obvious fashion
and
r (x,w) =
½
r1 (x) if x ∈ Γ1
rj (x,w) if x ∈ Γj for j > 1
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where γ∗j−2 = γ∗ (w) is used in the construction of rj (x,w). The argument on
pp.266—269 of MV97 is now readily adapted to the present set-up to yield:11
Theorem 1. In any pBe of G, the equilibrium strategies satisfy:
(a) R1 ∈
©
r (v2, γ∗ (v2))
¯¯
v2 ∈ γ
¡
vH
¢ª
.
(b) Along the equilibrium path, for any t > 1
Rt = r (γ∗ (vt) , γ∗ (γ∗ (vt))) ;
(c) For any t ≥ 1 and any history ht, type x initiates bidding if
Rt < r (x, γ∗ (x)) and not if Rt > r (x, γ∗ (x)).
Theorem 1 characterises the equilibrium reserve price path. As usual,
there may be multiple first-period reserve prices in equilibrium, and the seller
may even randomise over them. But once the first-period reserve has been
chosen, all subsequent reserve prices along the equilibrium path are uniquely
determined — see (b).
3 Revenue Equivalence and the Coase Con-
jecture
The objective of this section is to compare the expected discounted revenue
generated by the repeated English auction to that generated by a repeated
(first- or second-price) sealed-bid auction. The issue is not straightforward,
as the optimal reserve price path for the repeated English auction does not
match that of the repeated sealed-bid formats. As explained in the Intro-
duction, bidders in a sealed-bid auction have incentives to initiate bidding
earlier, ceteris paribus, because of the different participation effects. This
raises the reserve price (relative to the English auction) necessary to make
a type x bidder indifferent between bidding now or waiting. However, as
we shall see, the revenue-optimal path of bidder cutoffs is the same across
auction formats, as is the equilibrium expected discounted revenue.12
11We stress that the structure of the preceeding also follows MV97, though details
differ. We have also attempted to elaborate somewhat on the arguments in MV97, and
have occasionally reverted to those in Fundeberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), to add clarity.
12This fact is reminiscent of Proposition 2 in Riley and Zeckhauser (1983). Indeed, we
conjecture that an analogue of their result holds with exponential discounting in place of
the fixed sampling cost, c.
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Define GMV to be the repeated second-price, sealed-bid auction game
from MV97. Likewise, define GMV (j, v) to be the MV97 analogue of G (j, v)
and rMV1 (x) the analogue of r1 (x). Note that
ΠMV0 (v) = Π0 (v) =
Z v
1
Z X1
1
nY1f (X1) dFY1dX1
is the seller’s (equilibrium) payoff in GMV (0, v). Moreover, the analogues of
(2) and g1 (v, x) are, respectively:
rMV1 (x)FY1 (x) = (1− δ)xFY1 (x) + δ
Z x
1
Y1dFY1 (12)
and
gMV1 (v, x) =
rMV1 (x)nFY1 (x) [F (v)− F (x)] +
Z v
x
Z X1
x
nY1f (X1) dFY1dX1 + δΠ0 (x)
For the case j = 1, the truncated game G (j, v) has a higher equilibrium
reserve price in the first round than GMV (j, v), but the same bidder types
initiate first-round bidding:
Lemma 4. If x > 1, then rMV1 (x) > r1 (x).
Proof. Obvious. ¤
Lemma 5. If v ≥ x ≥ 1, then gMV1 (v, x) = g1 (v, x).
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that
∂gMV1 (v, x)
∂x
≡ ∂g1 (v, x)
∂x
.
Since r1 (1) = rMV1 (1) = 1, we also have
gMV1 (v, 1) = g1 (v, 1)
and the result follows. ¤
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Since we may write
gMV1 (v, x) = n
Z v
x
∙
pMV1 (x) +
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1
¸
f (X1) dX1 + δΠ0 (x)
where
pMV1 (x) = r
MV
1 (x)FY1 (x)
it follows from Lemma 5 that
n [F (v)− F (x)] p1 (x) ≡ n [F (v)− F (x)] pMV1 (x)
and hence
p1 (x) +
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1 = p
MV
1 (x) +
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1
for any X1 ∈ [x, v]. In other words, if the seller chooses cutoff x in the
first round of G (1, v) and type X1 wins the (first-round) auction, then the
expected payment to the seller is the same across formats. This suggests a
revenue-equivalence result. The English auction format provides less incen-
tive for bidders to bid early, so the seller must choose a lower reserve price
to induce the same set of types to initiate first-period bidding. However,
this is exactly offset by the fact that, in the English auction, types below x
participate once bidding starts.
More generally, we have:
Theorem 2. For any pBe of G, there is a revenue-equivalent pBe of GMV
and conversely.
Proof. It suffices to show that (in obvious notation):
γMVj (v) ≡ γj (v)
zMVj = zj
and
ΠMVj (v) ≡ Πj (v) .
for each j ≥ 1. We shall argue by induction.
The stated equalities hold for j = 1 by Lemma 5. We now show that
∂gMV2 (v, x, w)
∂x
≡ ∂g2 (v, x, w)
∂x
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and hence
gMV2 (v, x, w) ≡ g2 (v, x, w) .
The quantity r = r2 (x,w) satisfies
FY1 (x) {x− E [max {r, Y1} | Y1 ≤ x]} = δ
½
xFY1 (x)−
∙
p1 (w) +
Z x
w
Y1dFY1
¸¾
which implies
n (1− δ)xf (x)FY1 (x) =
nf (x)FY1 (x)E [max {r, Y1} | Y1 ≤ x]− δnf (x)
∙
p1 (w) +
Z x
w
Y1dFY1
¸
The right-hand side of this expression is the reduction in g2 (v, x, w) due to
the direct effect of dx: the probability that X1 = x, multiplied by the change
in the discounted expected payment from selling now rather than in the next
round. Likewise:
n (1− δ)xf (x)FY1 (x) = nf (x)FY1 (x) r− δnf (x)
∙
pMV1 (w) +
Z x
w
Y1dFY1
¸
when r = rMV2 (x,w). Hence the direct effects are the same across the two
auction formats.
It is easy to check that the indirect effect of dx — the probability of sale
at a price equal to r(x) times r0(x) — is the same across both auctions and
equal to (1− δ)n [F (v)− F (x)]FY1 (x).
The rest of the induction proceeds similarly. ¤
It is clear from the proof of Theorem 2 that, for two revenue-equivalent
pBe’s, the equilibrium reserve price path in the English auction model lies
below that of the sealed-bid model (and strictly so unless r = rMV = 1).
To help develop intuition for Theorem 2, let us sketch an alternative
proof, inspired by Stokey (1979). Consider the game G (j, v). Suppose the
seller chooses a sequence x ≡ {xt}j+1t=1 of type cut-offs satisfying
1 = xj+1 ≤ xj ≤ xj−1 ≤ · · · ≤ x1 ≤ v (13)
Types in (xt, xt−1) initiate bidding in period t. Type xt is indifferent between
bid initiation in period t or t+1. To implement this price discrimination strat-
egy, the seller may use the non-increasing reserve price sequence {Rt (x)}j+1t=1
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with Rj+1 (x) = 1 and Rt (x) = r (xt, xt+1) for t ≤ j. Define
pt (v0) =
1
FY1 (v0)
(
Rt (x)FY1 (Rt (x)) +
Z v0
Rt(x)
Y1dFY1
)
to be the expected sale price conditional on type v0 ≤ v winning the auction
in round t. Then the seller’s expected discounted payoff from (13) is:
δj+1 +
j−1X
k=0
Z xj−k
xj+1−k
½
[1− Fn (X1)] δj+1−k
∙
d
dX1
pj+1−k (X1)
¸¾
dX1
+
j−1X
k=0
[1− F n (xj−k)]∆k (x) (14)
where
∆k (x) = δj−kpj−k (xj−k) − δj+1−kpj+1−k (xj−k)
is the difference in the discounted (conditional) expected price between selling
to type xj−k in period j − k or in period j + 1− k.
Similarly, the seller in GMV (j, v)may implement the sequence x ≡ {xt}j+1t=1
satisfying (13) using the non-increasing reserve price sequence
©
RMVt (x)
ªj+1
t=1
with RMVj+1 (x) = 1 and RMVt (x) = rMV (xt, xt+1) for t ≤ j. In this case, the
expected sale price conditional on type v0 ≤ v winning the auction in round
t is
pMVt (v
0) =
1
FY1 (v0)
(
RMVt (x)FY1 (xt) +
Z v0
xt
Y1dFY1
)
This implies seller payoff
δj+1 +
j−1X
k=0
Z xj−k
xj+1−k
½
[1− Fn (X1)] δj+1−k
∙
d
dX1
pMVj+1−k (X1)
¸¾
dX1
+
j−1X
k=0
[1− F n (xj−k)]∆MVk (x) (15)
where
∆MVk (x) = δ
j−kpMVj−k (xj−k) − δj+1−kpMVj+1−k (xj−k)
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We shall show that (14) and (15) are the same. First, for any k:
∆k (x) = ∆MVk (x) = (1− δ) δj−kxj−k (16)
by the definition of xj−k. In other words, for xj−k to be indifferent between
bidding in periods j−k or j+1−k, the additional waiting cost must exactly
balance the expected reduction in discounted price paid. Next
d
dX1
½
Rt (x)FY1 (Rt (x)) +
Z X1
Rt(x)
Y1dFY1
¾
=
d
dX1
½
RMVt (x)FY1 (xt) +
Z X1
xt
Y1dFY1
¾
= X1F 0Y1 (X1)
so the marginal effect on the unconditional expected selling price from a
marginal increase in X1 is the same across auction formats. Given that (14)
and (15) start from a common minimum selling price ($1), and given the
equality in (16), it follows that the marginal effects on the conditional prices
are also the same:
d
dX1
pMVj+1−k (X1) =
d
dX1
pMVj+1−k (X1)
for all X1 ∈ (xj+1−k, xj−k) and all k. This proves the equality of (14) and
(15).
Therefore, the seller’s payoff from implementing x ≡ {xt}j+1t=1 is the same
across auction formats. Therefore, by characterising the seller’s problem
as one of choosing type cut-offs rather than reserve prices, we see that the
set of pBe cut-offs will coincide across auction formats, implying Revenue
Equivalence.
The foregoing argument clearly suggests that there is a more general
Revenue Equivalence Theorem at work. That is, by adapting the arguments
in Myerson (1981) to our dynamic setting, it is possible to show that any two
selling mechanisms that allocate the object in the same way — the probability
that buyer i receives the object in period t when his type is vi is the same
for any i, t and vi — and such that a buyer with vi = 1 receives the same
expected utility, will generate the same expected revenue for the seller.13 In
13The interested reader may refer to the working paper version, which is available by
request from the authors.
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the present paper, we instead focus on revenue equivalence as an intermediate
step towards proving the Coase conjecture for the case of English auctions,
which can be stated as follows:
Theorem 3. In any pBe of G, the seller’s expected discounted revenue ap-
proaches that of a one-shot, no reserve auction as δ → 1.
This result follows directly from our Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 in MV97.
4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 0:
Proof of (i). The first part has already been proved. From this it follows
that a given bidder expects to win the object if, and only if, he has the highest
valuation, no matter what bid-initiation strategy that he — or anyone else —
uses.14 This relies on the fact that bidders in an English auction can observe
when serious bidding starts. A bidder’s optimal bid-initiation strategy would
therefore remain optimal were he to be (reliably) informed that his was the
highest value.
The optimality of initiating bidding can only depend on history through
the current and previous reserve prices. It cannot depend on the probabilities
with which the bidder has mixed in the past, since these are not observable to
the seller or to the other bidders. Likewise, it cannot depend on the elapsed
time since the start of round t. It would do so only if the seller’s or some
rival bidder’s continuation strategy were contingent on this elapsed time. But
the seller’s continuation strategy is relevant only if round t ends without a
serious bid being received: plans formed by the seller at earlier points in time
during the round are redundant, and may be assumed to coincide with her
plan at the end of the round. Since the optimality of bid initiation at t is
established within the contingency in which no other bidder bids in round t,
the optimality of the decision is unaffected by anything learned about rival
bidders through the elapse of time within round t.
Hence, whether or not it is optimal for a bidder with valuation v to
initiate bidding in round t will depend only on the current reserve price Rt
14The “if” part of this observation ignores the zero measure event in which two or more
bidders tie for highest valuation.
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and history ht−1 of previous reserve prices. However, if a bidder is indifferent
between bid initiation at t and waiting, his decision may be made contingent
on elapsed time since the start of round t or on previous mixing by the
bidder himself without violating optimality. Nevertheless, such a strategy
can always be replaced with an “equivalent” one that depends only on the
reserve price history. In particular, the seller cares only about the probability
that a bidder with value v initiates serious bidding in round t given Rt and
ht−1. (She cannot observe bidders’ mixing probabilities.) These bid-initiation
probabilities can be computed from the bidders’ strategies, under suitable
technical restrictions on bidding strategies to ensure measurability. If bidders
were to amend their pBe strategies to depend only on Rt and ht−1 and to
conform to the seller’s expectations, the pBe would not be disturbed. In
particular, the seller’s strategy remains optimal, and bidders would still be
initiating serious bidding only when it is optimal to do so, this optimality
being determined by Rt and ht−1 alone, given the seller’s strategy. It is also
clear that the pBe outcome is unaffected by the change.
Proof of (ii). Define U (v, ht) to be the pBe continuation value of a bidder
with value v if the good remains unsold at the end of round t following
reserve price history ht.15 Note that U (v, ht) is necessarily independent of
the identity of the bidder in the case of n > 1. The difference
U (v0, ht)− U (v, ht) (17)
is bounded above by δ (v0 − v), since the v type can imitate the v0 type’s
strategy.
For n = 1, the result now follows easily, as shown by Fudenberg, Levine
and Tirole (1985, Lemma 1). The difference between the payoffs (i.e., the v0
return less the v return evaluated at the start of round t) from bidding in
t is δ (v0 − v), since the selling price is fixed at Rt and the sale occurs one
unit of time hence. Since the difference (17) must be discounted by δ < 1
when evaluated from the perspective of the start of round t, the v0 type has
a strictly stronger relative incentive to bid now rather than later.
15We define ht = ht−1|Rt where x|y denotes the concatenation of the vectors x =
(x1, ..., xm) and y = (y1, ..., yk):
x|y = (x1, ..., xm, y1, ..., yk) .
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When n > 1matters are more complex, as the expected sale price depends
on the valuation of the winning bidder.
With sealed bid auctions, and allowing for the possibility that bidders may
use mixed strategies, a bidder may not know for sure how many rivals he will
face if he bids at t, nor whether the good will remain unsold at the start of
round t + 1 if he refrains from bidding at t. Thus, the difference in future
returns (17) is now discounted by δρt (ht), where ρt (ht) is the probability
that all other bidders refrain from bidding at t. Next, consider the difference
in returns from bidding at t. With probability ρt (ht), this difference is just
δ (v0 − v), since no-one else bids. Likewise if the highest rival bid is below
v. In all other scenarios, the difference is some non-negative quantity, so the
expected difference is bounded below by
ρt (ht) δ (v
0 − v)
and strictly so if ρt (ht) = 0. Since
ρt (ht) δ ≥ δ2ρt (ht)
with equality iff ρt (ht) = 0, the result follows by the same logic as in Fu-
denberg, Levine and Tirole. This is the gist of the argument in McAfee and
Vincent (1997, Lemma 0).
Finally, for repeated English auctions, matters are more complex still.
Now the bid-initiation decision may be made conditional on the event that
the object remains unsold at the start of t + 1 if the decision is to refrain
from initiating bidding at t. Thus, difference (17) in continuation payoffs are
once again discounted by δ. The difference in expected return from bidding
now is16
δ
"
Gn−1ht (v) (v
0 − v) +
Z v0
v
(v0 − x) dGn−1ht (x)
#
where Ght is the distribution of types conditional on no rival submitting a
bid up to the end of round t given ht. It is not possible to assert that this
quantity exceeds δ2 (v0 − v).
To prove the result, we must therefore “unpack” U (v, ht) to obtain a
tighter upper bound on (17). We shall here sketch an argument that does
so. The basic idea is straightforward. Fix a particular bidder — say bidder
1. Imagine this bidder facing a deterministic path of reserve prices Rs, s =
16The following expression assumes v0 > v ≥ Rt.
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t, t+1, t+2, .... Let Y1 be the random variable denoting the highest valuation
amongst bidder 1’s rivals, and let Z (s) = max {Rs, Y1}. Let Gs denote the
distribution of Z (s) conditional on v ≥ Y1 and the object remaining unsold
at the start of round s, given the equilibrium expectations of bidder 1 at the
start of round t.
Let s ≥ t and consider the difference:Z v
1
(v − z) dGt (z) − δs−t
Z v
1
(v − z) dGs (z) (18)
= v
£
Gt (v)− δs−tGs (v)
¤
−
∙Z v
1
zdGt (z) − δs−t
Z v
1
zdGs (z)
¸
The derivative of this expression with respect to v is
Gt (v)− δs−tGs (v) > 0
where the inequality follows since δ < 1 and Gt (v) = Gs (v) = 1. If bidder 1
contemplates bid initiation in period t0 > t, then his payoff will be a weighted
average of terms
δk
Z v
1
(v − z) dGt+k (z)
for k = 0, 1, ..., t0 − t, since others may initiate bidding before t0. Thus, the
relative merits of bidding at t rather than t0 will therefore be represented by
a weighted sum of terms of the form (18) for s = 0, 1, ..., t0, with the weights
corresponding to probabilities that the bidding process starts in round s. It
follows that the relative incentive to bid now is increasing in v.
If bidder 1 faces a random path of future reserve prices, we may simply
apply the foregoing analysis to each possible path to reach the same conclu-
sion. ¤
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